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State v. Graves
State v. Graves, 0pinion No. 21892,
Filed March 31, 1983.
0ften seemingly unimportant techni-
calities end up causing trouble later on
in"law enforcement. The South Carolina
Supreme Court helped end problems in
such an area in State v. Graves, Opinion
No. n892, fitedFch 31;1383. This
case deals in part with the correct
breathalyzer to be used in administering
the breath examination in a DUI case.
The statute which sets up a chemicaltest'of the breath for those persons
charged with'driving under th; influence
of alcoho'l (Section 56-5-2950(a), S.C.
Code of Laws 1976 as amended) also re-quires the State Law Enforcement Division
to promulgate the ru1es necessary for
this test. The rules include determining
the kind of machine used to measure the
alcohol in the breath and therefore the
alcohol in the bloodstream. Rule 73-2
of the Rule and Regulations of SLED
approved various models of breath testing
devices manufactured by Stephenson Corp--
oration, Red Bank, New Jersey. Stephen-
son Corporation was acquired by Smith
and Wesson in 1971, who continued to
manufacture the same machine under the
Smith and Wesson trademark. Machines
bought since that time are Smith and
Wesson, and the machine in question is
Graves, Id., wds such a machine.
The problem facing law enforcement
officers was that in some trials, es-pecially before magistrates or city
recorders, the courts had decided that
under the law, these two machines which
were identical except in brand-name,
were not the same under the statute,
and thereforeo had excluded from thetrial testimony the results of the
breathalyzer. 0n appeal, at least one
circuit court judge agreed with the posi-tion because of the general rule in cri-
minal cases which strictly construes al'l
criminal statutes in favor of the defen-
dant.
In Graves, supra, the Supreme Court
took advarilE@ of an exceptioh which'was
dismissed in order to give direction to
the State courts. In an opinion concurred
by a1l justiceS, the court said:
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The circuit court proper'ly
dismissed respondent's tech-
nical exception to breatha'lyz-
er evidence. Specifical ly,
respondent contended that
unauthorized equipment was
used to establish his blood
alcohol content as .L9%,
considgrably above the figure
of .L0% which supports a
statutory presumption of in-
toxication. Section 56-5-2930,
1976 Code of Laws, as amended.
Breathalyzer equipment must
be approved for use by the South
Carolina Law Enforcement Divi-
sion (SLED) under Section 56-
5-2950(a), 1976 Code of Laws,
as amended and Rule 73-2, Rules
and Regulations of SLED. Pur-
suant to these requirements,
SLED approved various models
of breath testing devices
manufactured by Stephenson
Corporat'ion, Red Bank, New
Jersey. The breathalyzer
employed in this case was
manufactured by Smith and
Wesson, but the testjmony re-
veal s that Stephenson Corpora-
tion was acquired by Smith and
Wesson in 1971. Thus the machine
was the same machine previously
approyed; it sjmply bore a
different rrdrn€. To have
suppressed the probative
evidence of the breathalyz-
er test on the basis advanced
by respondent would have been
technical in the extreme.
The City Recorder ruled
properly and was correctly
sustained by the circuit
court. State v. Graves,
Opi nion No. 218921ET-ed
March 31, 1983.
It is now clear that the Smith and
Wesson machines can be used and .+.he re-
sults of these tests admitted into evi-
dence in South Carolina.
The second part of thjs case deals
with what is proper argument in a crimin-
al case. In Graves, supra, the prosecu-
tor argued toJhe -jury that the defendant
received special treatment because he was
a legislator and a Highway Patrolman had
been called to take him home. The Courtin a 4-1 decision reiterated its posi-
t'ion that a prosecutor must avoid appeal-
ing to a juror's personal bias or arous-
ing his passion or prejudice. In addi-
tion, the Court found that evidence
supporting the prejudicial arg[rment was
improper'ly admitted in the testimony of
the case. Graves, Id.
The question of how far a prosecu-
tor can go in vigorously prosecuting a
criminal case goes to the basic idea of
the duty of the State to deal fairly
with all citizens, even defendants.
Issues at trial should be decided on the
evidence of the case or lack thereof,
and not on the personal feelings of thejurors, the court, the prosecutor, or
police officers. It is therefore impro-
per to attempt to introduce any evidence
so1e1y to prejudice the jury. Irrelevant
and prejudicial evidence that is intro-
duced can I ead to a reversal or appeal .
Since Highway Patrolmen and Police
0fficers often act as prosecutors for
their own cases, they are subject to the
same restrictions as Attorney prosecu-
tors and therefore, must avoid prejudi-
cial evidence and argument to the jury.
To do otherwise risks the overturning of
a conviction and the uncertainty and
trouble of a new trial.
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